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Abstract:
This research examines how single-party regimes share power among ruling elites. An
examination of land institutions in China suggests that the ruling party takes advantage
of a statist and partially centralized land regime to distribute land development rights
(land quotas). This institutional arrangement allows central regime elites to use land
as patronage to build their clientelistic networks, which further constitutes a patronage-
based power-sharing scheme that allows central elites to share power among themselves.
Based on a data set of land-use conversion, the empirical analysis finds that central elites
channel land quotas to their political followers in provincial governments and the power
to influence land quota distribution is shared among several central elites. Moreover, land
quota distribution also reflects an effort to curb local governments’ discretion in land use.
These findings contribute to the literature on authoritarianism and land politics, and
have important implications for land institutional reforms in China.
Keywords: Power sharing; Patronage; Land institutions; China
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1 Introduction
Effective power sharing is essential for maintaining political order in both democratic
and authoritarian regimes. Access to power and rents binds regime elites to the existing
political structure by increasing their opportunity costs for defection. Power sharing is
particularly important for authoritarian leaders who are more vulnerable to unexpected
non-constitutional challenges than their counterparts in democratic governments.1 Well-
designed power-sharing strategies enhance autocrats’ likelihood of political survival in
uncertain political environments.
The existing literature on power sharing in authoritarian regimes focuses primarily
on the role of quasi-democratic institutions—such as parties, elections, and legislatures—
as instruments of power sharing. Scholars have made two observations regarding these
institutions. First, game-theoretical models suggest that institutions strengthen elites’
incentives to comply with the regime rather than oppose it.2 Second, cross-national
analysis confirms that regimes with quasi-democratic institutions are more resilient than
those without such institutions.3 Both types of research argue that power sharing is more
stable in single-party regimes.
While the research focusing on quasi-democratic institutions has significantly en-
riched our understanding of power sharing under authoritarianism, it tends to be exces-
sively abstract about the mechanisms through which these institutions function. It is
often assumed that parties, elections and legislatures strengthen power sharing, but it is
much less clear how exactly these effects take place. Observing this gap in the literature,
Pepinsky contends that institutions shouldn’t “be studied separately from the concrete
problems of redistribution, policymaking, and regime maintenance that motivate elite
behavior.”4 The goal of this research is to complement existing game-theoretical and
cross-national studies with a direct examination of concrete power-sharing strategies.
This article focuses on China and examines the power-sharing practices adopted by
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). China provides an ideal setting for researching
authoritarian power sharing for two reasons: First, it is one of the most resilient au-
thoritarian regimes in the world. This means that if power sharing is indeed crucial
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for authoritarian survival as the existing literature has contended, the Chinese regime
should have adopted some of the most effective power-sharing practices. Second, fo-
cusing on China also helps illuminate how party institutions help build effective power
sharing.
This article defines power as influence over the allocation of state resources, and
theorizes power sharing as the formal and informal rules and practices that authoritarian
leaders adopt to distribute such influence among ruling elites. To explore how Chinese
leaders exercise power sharing, I focus on land, a most important source of economic
rents in the Chinese political economy and the target of intense bargaining among po-
litical elites. An examination of China’s land institutions finds that the CCP employs
a statist and partially centralized land regime to manage the use of land and, as a re-
sult, the distribution of rents and benefits generated from it. More specifically, these
institutions—while having been widely criticized as inefficient and having caused seri-
ous social and political problems—serve three functions. First, they allow government
officials to generate economic rents and political benefits from managing land resources.
Second, the centralized allocation of land resources in the form of land quotas allows top
political elites of the Party to use land as patronage in building their political networks.
Finally, these land institutions also aim to curb the discretion of lower-level bureaucrats to
mitigate political and social risks and make the power-sharing scheme more sustainable.
Drawing on a panel data set covering 30 Chinese provinces between 1999 and 2013,
the empirical analysis of the research examines factors that influence the allocation of
land development rights (i.e., land quotas). First, it finds that stronger patron-client ties
between central elites of the Party and the leading officials of a province are associated
with more land quotas received by the province. Moreover, further breaking down the
Party’s central elites into several categories suggests that the observed effect of patron-
client ties on land quota distribution is not driven by ties with the Party Secretary General
(PSG), which constitutes the “first among equals” within the Party’s ruling coalition.
Rather, ties with other Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) members—the group of
elites whose loyalty is crucial for regime stability—drive the effect. These findings confirm
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the logic of authoritarian power sharing i.e., the power of allocating important state
resources being shared among top political elites of the regime. Finally, the land quota a
province received is also negatively correlated with the level of illegal land occupation in
the province in the past year, showing the mechanisms through which the Party controls
local discretion to make power sharing more sustainable.
The findings of the research also contribute to the literature regarding how politics
affects property-rights institutions. Existing studies based on developing countries in
Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America have identified political considerations as
important determinants of the property-rights regimes adopted in these countries. For
example, politicians facing electoral competition are often found to manipulate land and
property-rights institutions to mobilize support on the ballot, typically via local chiefs as
brokers.5 By contrast, this research focuses on a non-electoral political environment and
argues that land can also be distributed among authoritarian elites in the form of land
development rights. Property-rights institutions in this context serve as mechanisms for
regime leaders to deliver patronage and rents not to electoral constituencies but to peer
political elites.
This research also contributes to the burgeoning literature on land politics in China.
The dominant paradigm in the literature focuses on the interactions between local au-
thorities and land-deprived residents.6 Predatory local governments motivated by the
imperative to generate land revenue are often perceived as the primary culprits for the
conflict-ridden land development and urbanization process in China.7 By contrast, the
role of the central government and central political elites are less systematically exam-
ined.89 Focusing on elite politics at the national level, this research provides a novel
perspective to studying land politics in China.
The rest of the article will proceed as follows: I will first introduce the research
context and discuss land institutions in China. Section three proposes a theoretical
analysis on authoritarian power sharing and establishes theoretical hypotheses. Section
four presents the empirical analysis, followed by a conclusion.
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2 Land Institutions in China
China adopts a set of state-dominated and partially centralized land institutions. Land
is publicly owned, therefore the property rights granted to individuals, especially rural
residents, are severely restricted and insecure. The state monopolizes the supply of
construction land though the law, government regulations and zoning requirements. With
few exceptional scenarios, only the state itself is permitted to convert land from rural
to urban use. The central government employs a centralized administration system to
distribute land development rights among local governments to regulate the latter’s land-
use behaviors.
To be more specific, land in China is zoned by location and by use type. By location,
it is segmented into urban and rural land, with the former owned by the state and the
latter owned by rural collectives, with private ownership thus prohibited.10 Land is also
divided by use type into agricultural land (in which arable land is a nested type), land
for construction, and unused land. Only the state has the authority to convert land from
one type to another. For example, agricultural or unused land can only be converted to
more profitable construction land through the process of land requisition, which can only
be conducted by the state.
Under this institutional framework, the local government has become the only legit-
imate supplier of construction land used for non-agricultural purposes. In the central-
planning period, land was provided free of charge by local governments to users, mostly
state-owned enterprises. The amended constitution in 1988 allowed firms, including real-
estate developers, to lease construction land from local governments after paying land
conveyance fees (tudi churang jin). Because the amount of land conveyance fees signifi-
cantly exceeds the compensation paid to dispossessed residents, local governments extract
a tremendous amount of revenue through land requisition.
Since the 1990s, rapid economic growth and urbanization have dramatically driven
up the prices of urban construction land. Moreover, the housing reform conducted in 1998
abolished state provision of free or subsidized housing for state employees. This reform, in
combination with the much relaxed migration policies as well as the rapid accumulation
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of domestic wealth, has contributed to a nationwide real estate boom for nearly two
decades.11 Within the last two decades, the total area of land leased to developers and
the conveyance fees generated in this process have both skyrocketed.
While it is the local governments that conduct land requisition and transform rural
land into construction land, their land use behavior is regulated by the central government
through a centralized land administration system that allows Beijing to exercise strong
authority over land management. In 1986, the central government built the organiza-
tional foundation for the land administration system by establishing the State Bureau of
Land Administration (SBLA). In 1998, the central government revisited the Land Ad-
ministration Law to further shore up land control by the central government. At the
same time, the SBLA was replaced with the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR),
which enjoys higher administrative rank and exercises greater authority over the formu-
lation and implementation of land regulations and policies than its predecessor. Since
1998, the MLR has adopted a top-down quota system to set annual limits on the area of
construction land each locality could convert and develop.12 The quota system is hierar-
chical: The central government assigns quotas to provinces; then provincial governments
further distribute the quotas they receive among cites and counties in their jurisdictions.
Through the quota system, the central government significantly strengthens it control
over land development rights.
Three types of quotas are distributed from upper-level to lower-level government.
The first type of quota imposes an upper limit on the total area of new construction land
(xinzeng jianshe yongdi) (which can be converted from arable land) (gengdi), other types
of agricultural land (nongyongdi), or unused land. The second and third types of quota
set limits on the conversion of agricultural and arable land, respectively. The second type
of quota is therefore nested within the first type, and the third type of quota is nested
within the second type.
Due to the lack of secure land tenure and excessive state interventions, land insti-
tutions in China have caused several undesirable economic, social, and political conse-
quences. Wu Jinglian, a renowned Chinese economist, criticized these institutions as too
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inefficient and causing too much waste of resources.13 Many other scholars and even
government officials have also echoed this view. Moreover, land conflict has become
the single largest source of social instability. It is estimated that land disputes, espe-
cially those caused by local governments’ mandatory land requisitions, have accounted
for around 65 per cent of collective protests that occurred in the countryside.14 Finally,
corruption is particularly rampant in the land sector. Drawing on media reports, Gong
and Wu find that land corruption cases more than tripled between 2000 and 2009.15 The
original data I collected for the high-profile corruption cases that involved officials at or
above the vice-provincial-level between 1999 and 2013 also suggests that half of these
cases involve land corruption.
It is puzzling that, despite these problems, the central government has stubbornly
maintained the set of land institutions and constantly rejected proposals to reform it.
Existing explanations for the lack of reform focus on institutional factors. For instance,
a popular view attributes the lack of reform to unbalanced fiscal relations between the
central and local governments. It argues that the local government resists such reform
due to its desperate need of extra-budgetary revenue from the land market,16 and this
is in turn a result of the previous fiscal reform that assigned the local government with
unbalanced revenue and expenditure.17 As for the quota system, it is often interpreted
as part of the central government’s effort to preserve arable land and maintain national
food security.18 Rithmire’s recent work also finds that land institutions can serve as
important tools of macroeconomic management and regional development for the central
government.19 These existing explanations have significantly enriched our understanding
of land institutions in China, nevertheless they haven’t analyzed how elite politics may
also affect the functioning and outcomes of the land regime. This study suggests that
the political considerations of top regime elites may also constitute a political hurdle to
potential reform in land institutions.
7
3 Power Sharing, Patronage, and Land Institutions
in China
Power sharing is essential for the political survival of authoritarian regimes and their
leaders. In the absence of institutionalized mechanisms of leadership transitions, dictators
often face non-constitutional challenges orchestrated or facilitated by regime insiders, such
as military coups.20 These challenges compel authoritarian leaders to share power and
economic rents with important regime elites to maintain the latter’s loyalty.
The existing literature on authoritarian power sharing has identified quasi-democratic
institutions, such as political parties, elections, and legislatures, as important instruments
of power sharing. On the one hand, scholars adopt game-theoretical models to show that
quasi-democratic institutions induce elite compliance with the current regime.21 On the
other hand, cross-national analysis also shows that authoritarian regimes that adopt
quasi-democratic institutions are more resilient than those without such institutions.22
These findings lead many to conclude that quasi-democratic institutions increase the
stability of authoritarian power sharing.23 However, this research largely treats quasi-
democratic institutions as a black box without explicitly specifying the detailed mecha-
nisms of power-sharing in authoritarian contexts. To be sure, parties, elected councils,
and legislatures enable political elites to hold formal positions within them. However,
as Magaloni contended, “the mere existence of parties does not necessarily mean that
office-holders have power and influence over policy outcomes.”24 Blaydes reached a sim-
ilar finding about authoritarian legislatures.25 As a result, it is not entirely clear how
power is shared among ruling elites and how elites can derive benefits from being loyal
to the regime rather than sabotaging it. Pepinsky, for example, critiqued the tendency
to boil down complex power-sharing strategies and practices to just the existence of
quasi-democratic institutions and correctly pointed out that these institutions “cannot
be studied separately from the concrete problems of redistribution, policymaking, and
regime maintenance that motivate elite behavior.”26
Therefore, it is important to complement the game-theoretical and cross-national
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research with further analysis of detailed power-sharing strategies. Particularly, such
an analysis needs to address the following questions: First, how do quasi-democratic
institutions translate into power and economic rents for political elites? Second, how are
power and economic rents shared among authoritarian elites? Third, how do parties or
other quasi-democratic institutions make power-sharing arrangements more stable?
This research defines power as influence over the allocation of state resources and
conceptualizes power sharing as the formal and informal rules and practices that au-
thoritarian states adopt to distribute this influence among regime elites. In different
contexts, state resources could mean state budgets and jobs, natural resources, foreign
aid, banking, and in this research, land. The importance of such economic resources
to the stability of authoritarian regimes has been extensively documented and tested in
the existing literature. On the one hand, maintaining tight control over key economic
resources helps authoritarian states deal more effectively with potential challenges from
society. For example, Arriola finds that state control over the banking system allows
African states to forestall the formation of multiethnic coalitions among the opposition.27
On the other hand, economic resources can also be used as patronage to co-opt crucial
regime elites, a prevalent practice across the developing world.28
Power sharing requires not only state control over economic resources, but also en-
suring that the power to distribute these resources is shared broadly among regime elites
rather than concentrated in the hands of a single leader. In other words, authoritarian
regimes must design institutions to allow elites holding important political offices to influ-
ence the distribution of resources at their discretion. In this regard, legislatures in many
authoritarian regimes fail to serve a strong power-sharing function because legislative
seats tend to entail only limited influence over the allocation of economic resources.29
Arriola finds that African leaders instead have relied on cabinet appointments to share
more substantial power among political elites.30
However, power sharing tends to increase the number of claimants to limited state
resources and therefore entails potential political and social risks. Observing the post-
independence politics of Benin, Allen writes, “resources are necessarily limited, but ex-
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pansion and retention of support implied an ever-increasing pressure for resources.”31
Such pressure on the availability of resources undermines state capacity to perform criti-
cal functions and weakens political leaders’ ability to distribute patronage. Moreover, the
extraction of resources could also trigger public discontent and resistance, increasing the
risk of rebellion. In When Things Fell Apart, Bates finds that excessive predatory policies
adopted by African states lead to bottom-up rebellion and ultimately the breakdown of
political order.32
Given the political and social risks associated with power sharing, it is necessary
for authoritarian leaders to control the scope of beneficiaries by directing more resources
to political elites whose loyalties are more crucial to regime survival. However, effec-
tive targeting in power sharing requires strong top-down control. In many weak states
where centralized political control does not exist, resources and economic rents are of-
ten captured by local elites and contested among a large number of fragmented power
holders.33 In contrast, regimes ruled by Leninist parties have an institutional advantage
in terms of their ability to impose top-down political control. For example, the CCP
has long adopted a nomenklatura system of personnel control to strengthen compliance
by local officials and reduce their discretion.34 With these political tools, single-party
regimes can achieve more effective and sustainable power sharing and avoid destabilizing
consequences.
I argue that land institutions China adopts constitute an important power-sharing
platform for the ruling elites of the Chinese Communist regime. The premise of this ar-
gument is that local officials reap significant financial and political benefits from engaging
with the land market. Financially, as discussed earlier, land provides local officials with
massive extra-budgetary revenue that can be used with greater flexibility than the money
in the government budget. Politically, land development activities and economic rents
generated from the land market also increase local officials’ prospects of political advance-
ment. Large-scale land development projects, such as those infrastructural and industrial
projects, contribute to local officials’ “political achievements (zhengji),” which is widely
believed to be an important criterion used in the evaluation of local officials.35 Local
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officials also use land revenue directly to bribe their way to promotion.36 Motivated by
these political and economic benefits, local officials actively engage in land development
projects and intervene in local land markets.
The centralized land administrative system allows the Party’s central elites to exert
strong influence over the allocation of land resources and corresponding benefits. Rather
than directly intervening in the land market and land-use activities, central elites use
land indirectly as patronage to build and strengthen their patron-client ties with local
officials. The annual assignment of land quotas allows central elites to channel land de-
velopment rights to their followers in the local government. With more land quotas, local
officials are able to develop more construction land and accrue more benefits through
the development and transaction of land. Provincial and city level officials have to fre-
quently visit Beijing to lobby the central leaders for more land quotas, especially when
national land-use policies are tight.37 For central elites, they gain political benefits by
strengthening their own patronage networks and political influence. They can also ac-
quire personal wealth through illicit deals between their followers in the local government
and real-estate developers directly or indirectly connected to them, as several high-profile
corruption cases have suggested.38
As with other authoritarian rulers, CCP leaders also face potential threats from
within the regime.39 Concerned about political survival, these leaders are compelled to
share power and economic rents with their high-level colleagues. The centralized land
quota system helps serve this function by allowing central elites to gain access to land
resources that can be used as patronage, thus facilitating the building of political networks
as well as the accumulation of their personal wealth. Among these central elites, the most
important target of the Party’s power-sharing strategy are members of the PSC, whose
political loyalty are most crucial for the political survival of both the regime and individual
leaders themselves. Existing research has shown that this group of central elites not only
plays a dominate policy-making role but also systematically influences the allocation of
economic resources such as bank loans.40 In the land market, it is shown that connections
with these powerful central elites help business groups violate the central government’s
11
regulations and evade sanction.41
Two cases illustrate the strategic interactions between central elites and local of-
ficials in the distribution of land quotas. The first is about Sichuan province, which
experienced radical urban expansion between 2008 and 2012. Chengdu, the provincial
capital, was designated by the central government as a pilot city for land institution
reform, which allowed the city to enjoy many flexible policies in land development un-
available to other localities. The favorable policies received by Sichuan and Chengdu
benefited tremendously from the support of Zhou Yongkang, then a PSC member and
former Party Secretary of Sichuan. Zhou visited Sichuan six times after assuming the
leadership position within the PSC and provided strong support for local officials, espe-
cially Li Chuncheng — then Party Secretary of Chengdu and a prote´ge´ of Zhou — for
the latter’s pursuit of urban and land development. It is reported that during his visits
to Sichuan, Zhou had “positively appraised the achievements of the Chengdu in its ex-
periment of coordinated rural-urban development” and “demanded further promotion.”42
The area of land conversion in the province between 2008 and 2012 had increased by 140
per cent compared with the previous five years, thanks to the more generous land quota
granted by the MLR, of which Zhou himself served as the Minister between 1998 and
1999.43 In return, Li and other local officials in Sichuan channeled vast economic rents
to Zhou and other central elites by granting lucrative land deals to companies connected
with them.44
Zhengdong New District in Henan province provides another case that illustrates the
effects of patron-client relationships on the allocation of land development rights. The
New District, established in 2001, is a massive urban expansion project initiated and
developed by Li Keqiang, then governor of Henan province and a most favored prote´ge´
of Hu Jintao — Party Secretary General between 2002 and 2012. With strong central
connections, Li significantly increased the planned size of the New District from 5km2 as
originally envisioned by the local officials of Zhengzhou to 150km2, making it one of the
largest among such projects in China at that time.45 After Li was promoted to the PSC as
the vice premier, he channeled further political support to his former colleagues in Henan
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by designating Henan and the New District as the center of the national “development
strategy of central regions (zhongyuan fazhan zhanlue).” Strong central support provided
Henan and especially Zhengzhou with more quotas and greater flexibility in the use of
land. In an interview, a local official in the neighboring Shaanxi province complained that
similar development projects in his province lagged far behind because Shaanxi failed to
obtain the same kind of central support that Henan did in the early 2000s, especially
in terms of getting central approval for land use. He then added that the situation had
begun to change after Xi Jinping, the current Party Secretary General and a native of
Shaanxi province, came to power in 2012.46
The above cases provide preliminary evidence that patron-client relationships be-
tween central elites and local officials have an impact on the allocation of land develop-
ment rights. They also suggest that the power to distribute land quotas is not concen-
trated in a single leader’s hands but rather is shared among several key central elites,
especially those in the PSC. I therefore contend that the centralized land regime consti-
tutes a platform for power sharing among the Party’s central elites. More specifically, I
propose the following theoretical hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (Patronage Hypothesis) Patron-client ties between central
elites of the Party and local officials affect how much land quota each locality
receives.
Hypothesis 2 (Power-sharing Hypothesis) The power to influence the
distribution of land quota is shared among major central elites of the Party.
While serving above political functions, China’s land institutions have also led to
serious social and political risks that potentially understand the stability of the regime.
It is estimated that land requisition by the local government accounts for two thirds of
the instances of social conflicts and has significantly undermined public confidence in
the government.47 To address these risks, the Party has established several institutional
mechanisms to reduce local officials’ discretion in land use. For example, the Party
and central government use disciplinary actions, such as admonishing talks (yuetan) or
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administrative warnings (jinggao), against local officials who are non-compliant with land-
use rules. They also set up explicit institutions to punish the non-compliant behavior of
a locality with reduced land quota in the following year.48 It should be noted that these
measures not only help curb local discretion in land use and reduce the social and political
risks; they also strengthen the central government’s authority over the distribution of
land quota so that the patronage and power-sharing functions of land institutions are
maximized. These objectives are achieved through the Party’s centralized political control
over local bureaucrats. In other words, the CCP’s strong capacity of bureaucratic control
provides an advantage for the central government to alleviate the destabilizing effects of
power sharing and therefore make the power-sharing scheme more sustainable. Based on
the above discussion, I propose the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (Bureaucratic-control Hypothesis) Localities less compli-
ant with the central government’s land regulations are punished with lower
quota.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data and Variables
This section draws on a panel data set of 30 Chinese provinces between 1999 and 2013
to test above hypotheses.49 Land data comes from China Land and Resources Statis-
tical Yearbooks 2000-2014. For biographical information on central elites and provin-
cial officials, I draw on their official resumes, published by the Xinhua News Agency
(www.xinhuanet.com) and the People’s Daily Online (www.people.com.cn). All eco-
nomic indicators, such as GDP per capita, size of population, and fiscal revenue, come
from China Statistical Yearbooks 2000-2014. Tibet is excluded from the data set due to
missing values in several key variables.
The dependent variable is the various land quotas each province received at a given
year. Although the government does not publish data on land quotas, three indicators
can be used as proxy measures: the area of approved construction land converted from
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arable land (gengdi zhuanyong), the area of approved construction land converted from
agricultural land (nongyongdi zhuanyong), and the total area of approved new construc-
tion land (xinzeng jianshe yongdi). The central government has begun to impose quota
restrictions on the former two types of land conversion since 1999 and the third since
2006. Therefore, the three indicators serve as appropriate measures for the three types
of quotas respectively.50
A caveat about these measures is noteworthy. Central and provincial governments
have divided authorities over the approval of land conversion, depending on the type
of projects for which the converted land is used. The central government is primarily
responsible for the approval of land used for national projects for military and infras-
tructural purposes. Such projects are called “central projects (zhongyang xiangmu)” and
are typically planned and funded directly by the central government itself. By contrast,
provincial governments are primarily in charge of the approval of land used for local
industrial, infrastructural, and real-estate projects in the urban areas of their jurisdic-
tions. Compared with quota assigned to central projects, provincial officials benefit more
from the land quotas left to their own discretion, i.e., those used for local projects. Be-
cause of this distinction, in all three measures I exclude the areas of land assigned to
central projects and only consider the areas of land conversion approved by provincial
governments.51
Figure 1 describes the trends of the three types of land conversion between 1999 and
2013. It shows that the areas of all three types of conversion have been growing steadily
over this period. The average annual growth rates of these types of land conversion range
between 35 per cent and 41 per cent—much more rapid than the growth of GDP or urban
population during the same period. Moreover, the largest portion of new construction
land comes from the conversion of agricultural land, especially arable land, suggesting
that the occupation and development of agricultural and arable land probably plays the
most important role in China’s urbanization process.52
To test the first hypothesis, I use patron-client ties between the Party’s central elites
and provincial officials as the independent variable. Following Victor Shih’s seminal
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Figure 1: Land Conversion Approved by Provincial Governments (1999-2013)
research, I measure patron-client ties using whether a provincial official had overlapping
career trajectory with any Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) member.53 Overlapping
career trajectory is defined as two people working in the same system (xitong), such as a
central ministry, a Party department, a military division, or a province, for at least one
year and provided that the gap between their administrative ranks does not exceed one
level.54 For central elites of the Party, I focus on members of the PSC because the latter
is the most important policy-making body within the Chinese political system, and its
members are the most important ruling elites of the regime.
To test the power-sharing hypothesis, I further divide all PSC members into two cat-
egories: Party Secretary General and other PSC members. The Party Secretary General
is the supreme leader of the Party and the “first among equals” of China’s ruling elites.
Other PSC members also hold essential positions within the regime, such as the Premier,
Propaganda chief, or Chairman of the National People’s Congress. PSC members could
also become potential challengers to the supreme leader during critical moments such
as leadership transition or political crisis. Therefore, the loyalty of PSC members is ar-
guably most crucial for regime stability and the political survival of the Party Secretary
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General himself. This division allows me to test if the power to influence land quota
distribution is concentrated in the hands of the Party Secretary General or shared more
broadly among PSC members.
The third hypothesis argues that non-compliant localities and their officials are pun-
ished with lower quota in the following year. To test this argument, I use the ratio of
illegal land occupation to approved land conversion as a measure of local officials’ non-
compliance with the land regulations, including the quota restrictions, by the central
government.55
The analysis also includes several control variables. First, I control for a province’s
GDP per capita and the size of population. It is possible that the central government
allocates quota among provinces based on the latter’s economic endowments and growth
potential. Second, I also control for the average land price in a province, calculated by
dividing the total land revenue a province receives by the total area of construction land
supply. Theoretically speaking, the impact of land prices on land quota distribution is
not entirely clear. On the one hand, higher land prices motivate local governments to
convert more land into construction use. If the central government takes the interests
of local governments into consideration, it should assign higher quota to localities with
higher land prices. On the other hand, rapid increase in land prices is also an indicator
of an overheating economy, which may compel the central government to tighten land
supply to cool down the economy. Third, I also control for a province’s per capita fiscal
revenue, measured by the sum of local budgetary revenue and transfer from the central
government. This variable is included to test if the central government’s quota distribu-
tion takes local governments’ fiscal capacity into consideration. If so, local governments
with fiscal shortfalls should receive higher quotas. Fourth, I also control for a province’s
arable land area per capita as an imperfect measure for the province’s proneness to social
instability. Land grabbing in localities with lower land-population ratios is more likely
to meet stronger resistance from villagers.56 Last, I also control for the size of the state
sector. Localities with a larger state sector may receive higher land quota for two reasons:
first, the central government may provide more land to state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
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as a preferential policy to promote the latter’s development; second, higher land quota
could also reflect the patronage and rents SOEs receive from the central government and
central elites of the Party. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Unit Obs. Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Construction land
conversion
hectare 450 7605 6423 20.19 49640
Agricultural land
conversion
hectare 450 5121 4435 14.97 39526
Arable land conversion hectare 450 3489 3264 13.57 34267
Governor ties - 450 0.38 0.48 0 1
Party Secretary ties - 450 0.39 0.49 0 1
Governor age - 450 57.8 4.15 43 65
Governor tenure - 450 3.06 1.89 1 10
SOE size - 450 0.39 0.14 0.09 0.73
GDP per capita yuan 450 22780 18654 2545 100105
Population 10000 450 4328 2612 510 10644
Land price
10000
yuan/ha
448 570.9 909.1 5.80 9250.8
Fiscal revenue per capita yuan 450 4213 3845 424 19802
Illegal occupation - 450 0.11 0.16 0 1
Arable land per capita mu 330 1.66 1.14 0.12 6.20
4.2 Regression Analysis
Equation (1) summarizes the regression model. The dependent variable Yit is the area of
land conversion in province i at year t, measured using the three indicators described ear-
lier. Tit is a binary variable indicating whether there exists any patron-client tie between
a province’s leading official and any PSC member at a given year. More specifically, it
is equal to one if a provincial leader’s career trajectory has overlapped with that of any
incumbent PSC member, and zero if otherwise. Xit is a set of socioeconomic variables,
including GDP per capita, population size, the share of SOE employees among all em-
ployed people, fiscal revenue per capita, and the ratio of illegal land occupation. Because
data on arable land per capita is only available from between 1999 and 2010, including
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this variable will reduce the number of observations. To maximize the number of obser-
vations, I first drop this variable from the analysis to run a full-sample model, and then
put the variable back in a model with reduced sample size. All independent variables
except patron-client ties are lagged by one year, and the log transformation is taken for
the dependent variable as well as those independent variables measured at their levels
instead of ratios.
I also include two sets of dummies, αi and δt, to control for potential regional and
temporary heterogeneity. One-year lag of the dependent variable, Yi,t−1, is also included
to control for the autoregressive effects.57 Last, it represents the residual term.
Yit = γYi,t−1 + λTit + βXi.t−1 + αi + δt + it (1)
Because each province has two leading officials—a governor and a party secretary—I
first examine between the two who has greater influence over the land quota a province
receives. Table 2 reports the effects of patron-client ties between PSC members and the
two types of provincial leaders, respectively, on the land quota a province received. While
the patron-client ties of both provincial party secretaries and governors have positive
effects on land quotas, only the ties of governors reach statistical significance. This
suggests that, compared with provincial party leaders, governors typically have greater
influence over land issues in their jurisdictions. This is consistent with existing findings
that local administrative leaders (governors and mayors) typically play a more important
economic role than local party leaders (provincial and city party secretaries).58 Because
the effect of provincial party secretaries is insignificant, I only focus on governors in the
following analysis.
Table 3 reports the results of the full regression model. The first three columns use
patron-client ties between a governor and any PSC member as the main independent
variable, while the last three columns further break down patron-client ties into ties with
the Party Secretary General and ties with other PSC members. For each set of regres-
sions, the three dependent variables are the (log transformations of) areas of arable land
conversion, agricultural land conversion, and new construction land conversion, respec-
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Table 2: Comparing the Effects of Provinicial Party Secretaries and Governors
(1) (2) (3)
Arable Land
Agricultural
Land
New
Construction
Land
Secretary Ties 0.05 0.06 0.05
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Governor Ties 0.15** 0.15** 0.12**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
R-square 0.818 0.799 0.793
Observations 420 420 420
Prov Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Lag Dep Var Yes Yes Yes
1 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;
2 standard errors clustered at the provincial level are in parentheses.
tively.
The results provide strong empirical support for all three hypotheses. Other things
being equal, governors who used to be colleagues or subordinates of at least one incumbent
PSC member receive 8-13 per cent higher land quota relative to those who have no such
patron-client ties. The effects of patron-client ties vary depending on the type of land
involved—they are stronger in the cases of arable and agricultural land conversion than
in the case of total construction land. This is because for local governments, arable and
agricultural land are more valuable than previously unused land, as much of the latter
is either unsuitable or more costly for development. Therefore, quotas of arable and
agricultural land are more preferred by the local government and more likely to be used
by central elites as patronage.
Moreover, the last three columns of Table 3 show that patron-client ties with PSC
members other than the Party Secretary General have a significant effect, suggesting
that power is shared among the central elites of the Party. Somewhat surprisingly, ties
with the Party Secretary General, the nominally most powerful figure in the Chinese
political system, have a weaker and insignificant effect compared with ties with other
PSC members. Since the period focused in the analysis is mainly under the leadership of
Hu Jintao, this result suggests that, in the pursuit of land resources, Hu’s followers did not
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benefit as much from their patron-client ties with central leaders as the followers of other
PSC members did. This finding is consistent with a popular view that Hu was a relatively
weak Party Secretary General. A veteran analyst of elite politics in China contended that,
probably with the exception of Li Keqiang, most other members of Hu’s “Youth League
faction (tuanpai)” lacked strong administrative or economic achievements.59 Hu’s prudent
behavior reflected not only his own weakness and vulnerability as the “first among equals”
within the CCP’s ruling elites but also the importance of power sharing as a priority of
political survival.
One might suspect that the effect of patron-client ties with PSC members might be
driven by ties with the Premier as the leader of the government branch of the regime.
More specifically, it is possible that only ties with the Premier, due to the latter’s central
leadership role in the implementation of economic policies, dominate the results. To check
this possibility, I further break down all PSC members into three categories: the Party
Secretary General, the Premier, and other PSC members. Figure 2 plots the marginal
effects of patron-client ties between local officials and each different category of central
elites. For the sake of simplicity, I only plot the effects calculated based on the model
using the area of arable land conversion as the dependent variable. Each dot represents
the estimated effect of patron-client ties with the corresponding elite category, controlling
for other independent variables. The vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals
of these effects. The result suggests that both ties with the Premier and other PSC
members are significant, both statistically and substantively. The effect of ties with the
Premier is slightly stronger.
The third hypothesis is also confirmed. The more land a local government occupied
illegally, the lower quota it received in the following year. This result shows that the
central government also relies on the quota system to reduce local discretion in the use
of land as well as the social risk involved in it.
Among the control variables, the size of a province’s population has a significantly
negative impact on the land quota it received. One possible reason is that instead of
measuring potential demand for construction land, population size perhaps also captures
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the scarcity of land in the locality, which is not controlled in the baseline model due
to missing values in the variable. This issue will be addressed later. GDP per capita
has a positive and significant effect on the area of new construction land but not on the
conversion of arable and agricultural land. The impact of per capita local fiscal revenue is
negative, although not significant. This suggests that slightly more land quotas are given
to localities facing greater levels of fiscal shortfall. Substantively, 1 per cent decrease
in local fiscal revenue leads to 0.11-0.13 percent increase in land quota. Land price is
insignificant either, suggesting that land quota allocation is insensitive to the fluctuation
of local land prices. The share of SOE employees has a positive impact on land quota
allocation, as expected, although it is only significant in some but not all regressions.
Table 4 reports the results after controlling for the area of arable land per capita.
All major findings in Table 3 remain robust. In addition, arable land per capita is
positively correlated with all three types of land quotas. Substantively, one per cent
decrease in the area of per capita arable land results in 1.8-2.3 per cent decrease in the
areas of land conversion. Moreover, after controlling for arable land per capita, the effect
of population size becomes positive. This finding provides tentative evidence that the
central government allocates less quota to localities prone to social instability.
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Figure 2: The Effects of Patron-Client Ties on Arable Land Conversion
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5 Conclusion
Using China as a case, this research studies power sharing in single-party regimes. In con-
trast to the existing literature that focuses on the effects of quasi-democratic institutions
(e.g. elections, legislatures, and parties), this research looks into the concrete mecha-
nism of power-sharing. An examination of China’s land institutions suggests that the
statist and partially centralized land regime adopted by the Party serves a power-sharing
function. This regime enables central elites of the Party, PSC members in particular,
to intervene in the distribution of land development rights and use such rights as pa-
tronage for their political followers in the local government. The power to influence the
distribution of land development rights is shared among different PSC members rather
than concentrated in a single leader’s hands. The research also finds that land institu-
tions in China also seek to reduce local discretion in land use, thereby strengthening the
effectiveness and sustainability of the power-sharing function.
Apart from its theoretical contributions, this research also has important implica-
tions for economic reform and political development in China. First, the importance
of the state’s centralized control over land in CCP leaders’ strategy of political survival
shadows the prospect of more radical land institution reform. In recent years, strong
public demands have emerged for an institutional solution to the widespread irregulari-
ties and conflicts in the land sector. Since the 18th Third Plenum of the CCP Central
Committee, the Party has been pledging a systematic land institution reform and begun
to conduct local pilot programs to experiment with potential reform measures. Attract-
ing strong public attention, the reform discourses and local experimentation have been
widely interpreted as the beginning of more fundamental changes in land institutions.
However, the progress of the reform fails to live up to public expectations. In particular,
state monopoly in the supply of the most lucrative part of construction land as well as the
centralized quota system remain unchallenged. As this research suggests, one important
reason for the lack of reform lies in the political functions served by the current land
institutions.
The findings of this research also shed light on some recent developments in Chinese
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political economy. After two booming decades, the real-estate sector in recent years faces
an increasing risk of slowdown, and this happens at the same time with rising costs of
land requisition.60 As a result, both government revenue and rent-seeking opportunities
generated from land transactions begin to shrink. Given the importance of land as a
source of rents and patronage gluing different elite factions together, a weak real estate
sector will likely trigger political instability within the regime. This situation has induced
two responses from the Party’s leadership. First, because the economic costs of elite co-
optation and power sharing have become too high for the regime to afford, the Party’s
leadership began to use political strategies to remove powerful rent-seekers to prevent
them from depleting the regime’s most important source of rents. The massive anti-
corruption campaign adopted in Xi Jinping’s first term as the Party Secretary General
provides evidence to such a strategy. Between 2013 and 2015, for example, nearly a
hundred officials at or above the vice-provincial level, including a former PSC member,
were removed from office. However, as Wedeman has convincingly argued, campaigns may
be able to temporarily prevent corruption from growing out of control, but are unlikely to
deter corruption persistently.61 Therefore, the anti-corruption campaign reflects an effort
of Xi and his allies to reduce the scope of the extensive power-sharing scheme adopted
throughout the Hu Jintao era rather than a systematic overhaul of the institutions that
produce rent-seeking in the first place. The second response of the Party is to further
strengthen state monopoly over land and the centralized control over local officials’ land-
use behavior, which would reduce the number of the beneficiaries of the current land
regime and ensure rents flowing to those political elites whose loyalty is most crucial to
regime survival. As a result, land institutional reform will continue to be delayed in the
near future, and the problems in the land sector will remain intractable pathologies in
the Chinese political economy.
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Table 3: Explaining Land Conversion in Chinese Provinces (1999-2013)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Arable Agri. Const. Arable Agri. Const.
Ties 0.12** 0.13** 0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Ties (PSG) -0.02 -0.01 0.05
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Ties (others) 0.12* 0.13** 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Lag Arable Land 0.32*** 0.32***
(0.05) (0.05)
Lag Agricultural Land 0.33*** 0.33***
(0.05) (0.05)
Lag Construction Land 0.28*** 0.28***
(0.05) (0.05)
Population -2.17*** -1.80*** -1.41** -2.20*** -1.82*** -1.43**
(0.57) (0.60) (0.60) (0.57) (0.60) (0.61)
GDP per capita 0.37 0.16 0.86** 0.36 0.15 0.86**
(0.39) (0.41) (0.37) (0.39) (0.41) (0.38)
Revenue per capita -0.13 -0.11 -0.17 -0.13 -0.11 -0.17
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
Land Price -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
SOE 1.12 1.20* 0.66 1.13 1.21* 0.65
(0.69) (0.73) (0.71) (0.69) (0.73) (0.71)
Illegal Land Use -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 16.84** 16.16** 7.68 17.13** 16.47** 7.93
(6.61) (6.97) (6.73) (6.64) (6.99) (6.78)
R-square 0.833 0.814 0.816 0.833 0.814 0.816
Observations 418 418 418 418 418 418
Prov Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;
2 standard errors clustered at the provincial level are in parentheses.
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Table 4: Explaining Land Conversion in Chinese Provinces (1999-2010)
(1) (2) (3)
Arable Land
Agricultural
Land
Construction
Land
Ties 0.17** 0.19** 0.12
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Lag Arable Land 0.25***
(0.06)
Lag Agricultural Land 0.26***
(0.06)
Lag Construction Land 0.23***
(0.06)
Population 0.62 1.69 1.51
(1.31) (1.28) (1.29)
GDP per capita 0.27 -0.17 0.96*
(0.58) (0.57) (0.54)
Revenue per capita -0.22* -0.18 -0.20
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Land Price 0.02 0.01 -0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
SOE 1.06 1.44 0.72
(0.81) (0.88) (0.85)
Illegal Land Use -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Arable Land per capita 1.93** 2.34*** 1.80**
(0.88) (0.88) (0.84)
Constant 1.37 -2.00 -11.49
(10.53) (10.33) (10.06)
R-square 0.845 0.819 0.812
Observations 328 328 328
Prov Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
1 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;
2 standard errors clustered at the provincial level are in parentheses.
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